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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This case raises an issue of apparent first impression:  
whether an order denying the Rooker-Feldman defense is final as a 
collateral order.  We conclude that an order denying the Rooker-
Feldman defense is not final as a collateral order and is not 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  We 




 The Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas 
of Philadelphia County operates a nursery at the Family Court 
Building in Philadelphia.  In operating this nursery, the Family 
Court provides an area for supervised visitation in cases in 
which supervised visitation has been ordered by the Family Court.  
In early November of 1993, the Honorable Esther Sylvester, 
Administrative Judge of the Family Court Division of the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and a defendant in this case, 
approved the closing of the Family Court nursery on two dates:  
December 26, 1993 and January 2, 1994.  The plaintiffs, Andre 
Bryant, a non-custodial parent restricted, by court order, to 
visitation in the Family Court-operated nursery, and Fathers' and 
Children's Equality, Inc., a non-profit Pennsylvania corporation 
"chartered to insure the continual access of children to their 
non-custodial parents and extended family members," Plaintiffs' 
brief at 3, sought in Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to enjoin 
the defendants from closing the nursery on these days.  The 
matter was transferred on jurisdictional grounds to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court where the plaintiffs' request for a 
preliminary injunction was denied without hearing.  No appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court was sought. 
 In early March of 1994, Judge Sylvester again 
authorized the closing of the Family Court nursery, this time on 
April 3, 1994.  Soon after the authorization of this additional 
nursery closing, the plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit 
in which they claim that by closing the nursery, the defendants 
violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
  
In lieu of filing an answer, the defendants moved to dismiss 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6).  The defendants 
contended, inter alia, that judicial immunity and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine required dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.  
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and 
ordered that discovery proceed.  This appeal followed.1 
                     
1
.   The question of the applicability of judicial immunity is 
not before us, as that issue, though argued in the defendants' 
brief, was waived at oral argument, during which the following 
exchange took place: 
 
The Court: You are not appealing from the 
denial of your motion insofar as it 
related and relied on judicial 
immunity? 
 
Answer:  No, your honor, it is purely the 
Rooker-Feldman and the qualified 
immunity which applies to all the 
defendants . . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
The Court: Let me make sure I understand you.  
I understood you in response to my 
question on direct to say that the 
issue of whether your motion was 
wrongfully denied insofar as it 
relied on judicial immunity was not 
before us, you were not pressing 
that argument . . . you wrote a 
section in your brief on it, but 
you are not -- 
 
Answer:  I am not pressing the judicial 
immunity argument . . . . 
 
The Court: You are not just talking about your 
argument this morning, your oral 
argument, you are saying we do not 
have to address those issues 
because your clients are no longer 




 Ordinarily, we review only "final" decisions of the 
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Federal Ins. Co. v. 
Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1279 (3d Cir. 1993).  
A decision is final only when there is a "`decision by the 
(..continued) 
Answer:  I do not press the judicial 
immunity argument, your honor. 
 
 Nor is the issue of qualified immunity before us, the 
defendants arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.  Having 
found that the defendants did not assert qualified immunity, the 
district court did not consider the applicability of the 
qualified immunity defense.  In this appeal, the defendants 
contend, with apparent support in the trial record, that they did 
in fact argue qualified immunity in the district court.  However, 
the defendants did not assert qualified immunity in their motion 
to dismiss, nor did they argue qualified immunity in their brief 
in support of the motion.  In a brief styled "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and in 
Further Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment," which the defendants filed 
some six days prior to the district court's denial of their 
motion to dismiss, the defendants for the first time argued 
qualified immunity.  Under these circumstances, the district 
court properly refrained from considering the issue of qualified 
immunity.  Had the district court considered qualified immunity, 
the plaintiffs would have been prejudiced by not having had an 
opportunity to respond to the defendants' arguments regarding the 
applicability of qualified immunity prior to the district court's 
ruling on the defendants' motion.  And because the district court 
did not err in refusing to consider qualified immunity, we lack 
jurisdiction to hear the defendants' appeal to the degree it 
raises the issue of qualified immunity.  See Kulwicki v. Dawson, 
969 F.2d 1454, 1460 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[o]ur jurisdiction to hear 
immunity appeals is limited only where the district court does 
not address the immunity question below, or where the court does 
not base its decision on immunity per se"). 
2
.   28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides: 
 
  The courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the 
United States . . . . 
  
district court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.'"  Id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  According to 
the defendants, however, we have appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The defendants contend the 
district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss 
is appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine first 
articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541 (1949).  In Cohen, the Supreme Court held that a "small 
class" of collateral orders are final and appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 even though they do not terminate the underlying 
litigation.  Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.  For an order to come within 
Cohen's collateral order rule, it must satisfy three tests:  
first, the order must "conclusively determine" the disputed 
question; second, it must "resolve an important issue completely 
separate" from the merits of the action; and third, it must be 
"effectively unreviewable" on appeal from a final judgment.  
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978).  If 
the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of these 
requirements, it is not an appealable collateral order.  See 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 
(1988); Communication Workers v. American Tel. & Tel., 932 F.2d 
199, 205 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the 
collateral order doctrine as a "narrow exception" to the final 
  
judgment rule,3 see, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 
472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (citation omitted), and we have, 
accordingly, construed the doctrine narrowly "`lest the exception 
swallow up the salutary general rule' that only final orders may 
be appealed."  Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 783 n.10 
(3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); see Transtech Industries, Inc. 
v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We have 
followed the Supreme Court's admonition and `have consistently 
construed the Cohen exception narrowly rather than expansively.'" 
(citations omitted)).  Strict construction of the collateral 
order doctrine is designed to further the long-standing 
Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals which underlies 
the final judgment rule.  See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 
                     
3
.   Recently, the Supreme Court observed that the collateral 
order doctrine is best understood not as an exception to the 
"final decision" rule laid down by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
"but as a `practical construction' of it."  Digital Equipment 
Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1995 
(1994). 
 
  We have repeatedly held that the statute 
entitles a party to appeal not only from a 
district court decision that "ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
more for the court to do but execute the 
judgment," but also from a narrow class of 
decisions that do not terminate the 
litigation, but must, in the interest of 
"achieving a healthy legal system," 
nonetheless be treated as "final." 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
  
174, 177 (3d Cir. 1984).4  To guard against the temptation of 
expanding the doctrine's reach, the Supreme Court has instructed 
that the issue of the immediate appealability of orders that do 
not terminate litigation is to be determined for the entire 
category to which the order belongs, "without regard to the 
chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a 
`particular injustice' averted, by a prompt appellate court 
decision."  Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1996 (1994) (citation omitted). 
 Before determining whether the district court's order 
denying the defendants' Rooker-Feldman defense qualifies as a 
collateral order, a word or two is in order concerning Rooker-
Feldman.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal 
district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct 
review of state court adjudications or to hear constitutional 
                     
4
.   We have stated that the final judgment rule serves a number 
of salutary purposes: 
 
  It is intended to ensure efficient 
administration of scarse judicial resources.  
It facilitates maintenance of "the 
appropriate relationship between [trial and 
appellate] courts."  In addition, in cases 
where the litigants may have unequal economic 
resources, it protects the judicial process 
and its participants from the delay which can 
prove advantageous to a well-financed 
litigant, and fatal to the less well-endowed. 
 
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(citations omitted); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
  
claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's 
decision.  District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 
U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983).  See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) ("Under the legislation of Congress, no 
court of the United States other than this Court could entertain 
a proceeding to reverse or modify" a state court judgment.).  
This limitation upon federal district court subject matter 
jurisdiction is usually said to derive from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 
which provides that "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the 
highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . ."  See, e.g., Valenti v. 
Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992).  In addition to this 
formal statutory basis for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we have 
identified other justifications for the rule: 
 As with Younger abstention, which requires 
federal courts to abstain when there is a 
pending state court proceeding, part of the 
justification for Rooker-Feldman is respect 
for state courts.  Just as federal district 
courts should presume that pending state 
court proceedings can correctly resolve 
federal questions, they should also presume 
that completed state court proceedings have 
correctly resolved these questions. 
 
  A second justification for Rooker-
Feldman stems from its similarity to claim 
preclusion.  Like claim preclusion, Rooker-
Feldman is partly concerned with finality, 
with ensuring that litigants do not take 
multiple bites from the same apple.  Once 
litigants' claims have been adjudicated in 
the state court system, they should not also 
have access to the entire federal court 
system. 
  
Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1157 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted).  With this sketch of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's 
contours in mind, we turn now to evaluate the immediate 
appealability of the district court's order denying the 
defendants their Rooker-Feldman defense. 
 III. 
 A decision denying a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is considered to fall outside the 
Cohen exception to the final decision rule.  See Transtech 
Industries, Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 58 (3d Cir. 
1992); United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction generally 
fail the third prong of the Cohen test); Moore's Federal Practice 
¶ 110.10 p. 74 (citing cases).  Likewise, decisions denying 
assertions of res judicata are considered to be beyond the 
collateral order exception.  See Digital Equipment Corporation, 
114 S. Ct. at 1998; Transtech Industries, 5 F.3d at 58.  Because 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has a close affinity both with 
notions of subject matter jurisdiction and claim preclusion, we 
might be tempted to resolve the issue of the immediate 
appealability of Rooker-Feldman denials by way of analogy to 
these categories of claims.  However, underlying the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine are concerns rooted in federalism and comity, 
concerns not necessarily present within the concepts of claim 
preclusion and subject matter jurisdiction.  Therefore, we will 
address the immediate appealability of the denial of a Rooker-
  
Feldman defense with explicit reference to the issue of respect 
for state courts that underlies the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
 Because we conclude that the third requirement -- that 
the order be "effectively unreviewable" on appeal from a final 
judgment -- is not met in this case, we need not discuss the 
first and second prerequisites for the collateral order doctrine 
to determine the immediate appealability of a denial of a Rooker-
Feldman defense.  See Communication Workers, 932 F.2d at 205 n.6 
("Since we find that the district court's order does not satisfy 
the third prong of Cohen, we do not consider whether the first 
and second prongs of Cohen are satisfied.").  The Supreme Court 
has explained that, as a general rule, an order is "effectively 
unreviewable" only where "the order at issue involves `an 
asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be 
destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.'"  Lauro Lines 
S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499-500 (1989) (citation 
omitted); accord Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, an order 
must be such that "review [of the order] postponed will, in 
effect, be review denied"). 
 The Court's most recent discussion of the collateral 
order doctrine appears in Digital Equipment Corporation, decided 
less than a year ago.  In that case, Desktop Direct, Inc. 
("Desktop") sued Digital Equipment Corporation ("Digital") for 
unlawful use of the "Desktop Direct" name.  Digital Equipment 
Corporation, 114 S. Ct. at 1995.  Soon after the filing of the 
complaint, the parties reached a settlement agreement.  Pursuant 
  
to the agreement, Digital agreed to pay Desktop a sum of money 
for the right to use the "Desktop Direct" trade name and 
corresponding trademark, and for waiver of all damages and 
dismissal of the trademark infringement suit brought by Desktop 
against Digital.  Id.  Following the settlement agreement, 
Desktop filed a notice of dismissal in the district court.  
Several months later, however, Desktop moved to vacate the 
dismissal and rescind the settlement agreement on the ground that 
Digital had misrepresented material facts during the settlement 
negotiations.  Id.  The district court granted this motion.  
Digital then appealed.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit dismissed Digital's appeal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction, holding that the order of the district court was 
not appealable under section 1291 because it neither ended the 
litigation nor fell within the collateral order exception to the 
final judgment rule.  Id.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to consider whether an order denying effect to a private 
settlement agreement comes within the ambit of the collateral 
order rule.  Id. 
 During the course of its analysis of this question, 
analysis which led to an affirmance of the Tenth Circuit's 
dismissal of Digital's appeal, the Court rejected Digital's 
argument that the identification of some interest or right that 
would be "irretrievably lost" per se satisfies the third Cohen 
requirement: 
 [T]he strong bias of § 1291 against piecemeal 
appeals almost never operates without some 
cost.  A fully litigated case can no more be 
  
untried than the law's proverbial bell can be 
unrung, and almost every pretrial or trial 
order might be called `effectively 
unreviewable' in the sense that relief from 
error can never extend to rewriting history.  
Thus, erroneous evidentiary rulings, grants 
or denials of attorney disqualification, and 
restrictions on the rights of intervening 
parties may burden litigants in ways that are 
only imperfectly reparable by appellate 
reversal of a final district court judgment 
. . . .  But if immediate appellate review 
were available every such time, Congress's 
final decision rule would end up a pretty 
puny one, and so the mere identification of 
some interest that would be "irretrievably 
lost" has never sufficed to meet the third 
Cohen requirement. 
Digital Equipment Corporation, 114 S. Ct. at 1998 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
 The Court also rejected Digital Equipment's contention 
that a party's ability to characterize the right allegedly denied 
as a "right not to stand trial" is both sufficient and necessary 
for a finding that the order appealed from is a collateral order.  
This contention, the Court explained, "is neither an accurate 
distillation of our case law nor an appealing prospect for adding 
to it."  Id.  The Court further explained that limiting the 
collateral order analysis to a focus upon whether the interest 
asserted could be called a "right not to stand trial" is 
inadequate to protect against "the urge to push the § 1291 
limits."  Id.  
 We have, after all, acknowledged that 
virtually every right that could be enforced 
appropriately by pretrial dismissal might 
loosely be described as conferring a "right 
not to stand trial."  Allowing immediate 
appeals to vindicate every such right would 
move § 1291 aside for claims that the 
  
district court lacks personal jurisdiction, 
that the statute of limitations has run, that 
the movant has been denied his [or her] Sixth 
Amendment right to speedy trial, that an 
action is barred on claim preclusion 
principles, that no material fact is in 
dispute and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, or merely that 
the complaint fails to state a claim.  Such 
motions can be made in virtually every case, 
and it would be no consolation that the 
party's meritless summary judgment motion or 
res judicata claim was rejected on immediate 
appeal; the damage to the efficient and 
congressionally mandated allocation of 
judicial responsibility would be done, and 
any improper purpose the appellant might have 
had in saddling its opponent with cost and 
delay would be accomplished.  Thus, precisely 
because candor forces us to acknowledge that 
there is no single "obviously correct way to 
characterize" an asserted right, we have held 
that § 1291 requires courts of appeals to 
view claims of a "right not to be tried" with 
skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye. 
Id. at 1998-99 (citations omitted). 
 In the wake of Digital Equipment Corporation, a party's 
ability to characterize a district court's decision as denying an 
irreparable "right not to stand trial" of itself will not suffice 
to entitle that party to an immediate appeal of the decision.  
See Digital Equipment Corporation, 114 S. Ct. at 1998.  Following 
Digital Equipment Corporation, the analysis required under the 
third prong of the Cohen test does not entail so much the 
characterization of the right denied as it does inquiry into the 
relative value or importance of the interests "that would be 
[forever] lost through rigorous application of a final judgment 
requirement.  Id. at 2001. 
  
 The defendants contend that the interests in federalism 
and comity sought to be protected by Rooker-Feldman would be 
irreparably harmed by the very fact of federal judicial inquiry 
into the state court decision at issue.  "Once a state 
adjudication is subjected to discovery, inquiry, review, trial, 
etc., the integrity of the decision, as protected from federal 
court review by Rooker-Feldman is gone forever."  Defendants' 
Reply at 6.  According to the defendants, Rooker-Feldman is the 
"equitable corollary to judicial immunity": 
 [I]t is the immunity state decisions enjoy 
from federal district court review.  Akin to 
Eleventh Amendment, absolute, or qualified 
immunity, Rooker-Feldman is of no practical 
value after final judgment and appeal, i.e., 
after federal review of a state court 
adjudication takes place.  Any benefit to 
state courts conferred by Rooker-Feldman "is 
for the most part lost as litigation proceeds 
past motion practice."  Quite simply, the 
very fact of a federal court inquiry, without 
immediate appeal, into a state court 
adjudication . . . renders Rooker-Feldman 
worthless. 
Defendants' Reply at 7-8. 
 We disagree with the defendants' contention that 
Rooker-Feldman is of no practical value if its ultimate 
vindication must await the entry of final judgment following 
district court review of the state court adjudication at issue.  
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine's value as a protector of state 
courts is not irreparably undermined by district court review of 
state court adjudications; so long as district court review of a 
state court adjudication is followed by the proper application of 
the doctrine at the court of appeals level, the interests that 
  
Rooker-Feldman seeks to further will be secured.  To understand 
why this is so, one need only compare Rooker-Feldman to the types 
of claims already deemed to fall within the ambit of the 
collateral order doctrine. 
 The purpose of the classic immunities -- Eleventh 
Amendment, absolute and qualified immunity -- all considered to 
fall within the collateral order doctrine, is to prevent the 
holder of the immunity from being dragged into federal district 
court to answer to civil suits for damages.  See Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (stating that qualified 
immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 
liability; "and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost 
if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial"); Puerto Rico 
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, 113 S. Ct. 684, 689 
(1993) ("`the very object and purpose of 11th Amendment [are] to 
prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive 
process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private 
parties'" (citation omitted)); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 
(1982) (the essence of absolute immunity is the possessor's 
entitlement not to have to answer for his or her conduct in a 
civil damages action).  It is easy to see how this purpose would 
be effectively thwarted were an order denying qualified immunity, 
for example, not held to be immediately appealable.  Were such an 
order not immediately appealable, the qualified immunity holder 
would be forced to endure the burden of a trial -- the very 
"harm" the immunity is supposed to immunize the holder against -- 
before being permitted to seek the vindication of the immunity 
  
right.  Simply put, the immunity holder would obtain absolutely 
nothing of value from the ultimate vindication of the immunity 
interest following a trial in the district court.5 
 Indeed, a finding that the failure to allow immediate 
appeal would lead to the infliction of some irreparable harm on 
an actual person or entity represents a common thread running 
through the cases in which we have found that the order in 
question constitutes a collateral order.  In Praxis Properties v. 
Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1991), for example, a 
case in which we found an order denying Resolution Trust 
Corporation ("RTC") a stay under the stay provision of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989, 12 U.S.C. § 1812(d)(12)6 to be a collateral order, we 
stated: 
                     
5
.   Precisely the same can be said, and has been said by the 
Supreme Court, with respect to orders denying the protection of 
the Speech or Debate Clause, as well as orders denying the right 
not to stand trial on double jeopardy grounds.  See Helstoski v. 
Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (holding that an order denying the 
protection of the Speech or Debate Clause is immediately 
appealable); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding 
that an order denying the right not to stand trial on double 
jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable). 
6
.   12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12) provides: 
 
  After the appointment of a conservator or 
receiver for an insured depository 
institution, the conservator or receiver may 
request a stay for a period not to exceed -- 
 
   (i)  45 days, in the case of any 
conservator; and 
 




 Congress afforded RTC this right to a stay 
under § 1821(d)(12) because it realized that 
upon RTC's appointment as receiver or 
conservator for a failed thrift, RTC is 
likely to find the thrift in a state of 
profound disarray and may require some 
breathing room to orient itself and determine 
how best to proceed with pending litigation.  
If the district court denies a proper request 
for a stay under § 1821(d)(12), RTC's 
statutory right to a short litigation cease-
fire, like a government official's right to 
qualified immunity, is "irretrievably lost" 
absent immediate appeal. 
Id. at 60.  Similarly, in Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & 
Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993), a case in which we 
extended the collateral order doctrine to a claim for immunity 
from suit conferred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, we stated: 
 [P]roviding review only after a trial [of the 
order denying the FSIA defense] would destroy 
the "legal and practical value" of their 
sovereign immunity defense.  At the post-
trial stage of the proceeding, the Dutch 
parent corporations will have been forced to 
endure the very burden they are arguing they 
should not be subjected to in the first place 
-- a trial on the merits. 
Id. at 1282.  See also In re School Asbestos Litigation, 842 F.2d 
671 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that an order denying a party the 
right to engage in public communications with persons and in fora 
unrelated to the litigation was immediately appealable because 
"`the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods 
of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.'" 
(..continued) 
  in any judicial action or proceeding to which 
such institution is or becomes a party. 
  
(citation omitted)).  In each of these cases, crucial to our 
conclusion that the order in question constituted an immediately 
appealable collateral order was the fact that failure to afford 
immediate appeal would have rendered the right asserted worthless 
to the actual entity holding the right.  The same simply cannot 
be said in the context of Rooker-Feldman. 
 One of the interests that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
seeks to promote is respect for state courts.  Guarino, 11 F.3d 
at 1157.  To further this interest, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
precludes federal district court review of state court 
adjudications.  See id.  Significantly, the protection that 
Rooker-Feldman affords attaches not to the state courts 
themselves, but rather to their adjudications.  Unlike people, 
states and state entities -- the direct recipients and 
beneficiaries of the classic immunities, for example -- 
adjudications do not suffer irreparably by being haled into 
federal district court for review.  Indeed, once a court of 
appeals rules that under Rooker-Feldman, the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the state court 
adjudication, it is, both as a practical as well as a legal 
matter, as if the state court adjudication had never been 
reviewed by a federal district court in the first place.  So long 
as the state court adjudication's Rooker-Feldman-derived 
"immunity" is acknowledged and vindicated by the court of appeals 
following the entry of a final judgment, the interest in  
  
respecting state courts by holding their adjudications beyond 
federal district court scrutiny is adequately protected.7 
 By concluding that the denial of a Rooker-Feldman 
defense does not give rise to an immediately appealable 
collateral order, we do not gainsay the importance of the 
interests in federalism and comity that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine seeks to protect.  We simply believe that these 
interests are not irreparably harmed through rigorous application 
of the final judgment rule.  We note that in other contexts these 
same interests have been understood to be adequately vindicable 
on appeal following the entry of final judgment.  See Coleman by 
Lee v. Stanziani, 735 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the 
denial of a motion to dismiss asserting Younger v. Harris 
abstention grounds satisfies none of the Cohen requirements). 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Having concluded that an order denying the Rooker-
Feldman defense is not immediately appealable under the 
collateral order rule, we will dismiss for lack of appellate  
                     
7
.   We say that the Rooker-Feldman interests are adequately 
vindicable on appeal from a final judgment because we recognize, 
as has the Supreme Court, that section 1291 never operates 
without some cost.  Digital Equipment Corporation, 114 S. Ct. at 
1998.  Litigants are always burdened in ways that are "only 
imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district 
court judgment."  Id. 
  
jurisdiction the defendants' appeal from the district court's 
order denying their Rooker-Feldman defense. 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
